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Recent Developments

Pittman v. Atlantic Realty Co.:
Court of Appeals of Maryland Rejects the "Sham Affidavit" Rule and Reinforces
the Separate Functions of the Judge and Jury
By Amy E. Askew

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that an
affidavit, submitted for the purpose
of withstanding a motion for
summary judgment, that conflicts
with original deposition statements,
should not automatically be
rejected, as is the standard practice
under the federal "sham affidavit"
rule. Pittman v. Atlantic Realty
Co., 359 Md. 513, 540, 754 A.2d
1030 (2000). The court further held
that a judge's following ofthe federal
"sham affidavit" rule equates to a
determination of the affiant's
credibility, a decision that lies solely
with the jury. !d. at 540, 7 54 A.2d at
1045-44.
In 1996, Shari Hall (''Petitioner'')
brought an action on behalfofher son,
Terran, against Northern Brokerage
Company and Atlantic Realty
Company ("Respondents") in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City.
Petitioner alleged that Respondents'
lead paint violation at Lauretta Avenue
("subject premises") resulted in Terran
being exposed to lead paint and was
a substantial cause of injuries. In lead
paint causes of actions, a plaintiffhas
the burden of proving that the
defendant's conduct was a substantial
factor in causing the injuries.
Petitioner in this case produced expert
testimony in order to prove the
requisite causal connection.
During a deposition, Petitioner
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testified that she had seen paint
chips at the subject premises and
that she had seen her son ingest
them. During discovery, Petitioner
was also given an interrogatory
seeking the addresses and dates of
the places where she and Terran
lived. Petitioner responded that they
had lived at the subject premises
from 1992 until1993 and at another
location from 1993 to 1996. She
also stated that there was a period,
although undetermined, that Terran
was at the subject premises from
8:00a.m. to 4:00p.m. for purposes
of day care. During a deposition,
Petitioner gave a variety of
responses as to the actual dates she
resided on the subject premises.
Her inconsistent statements
ultimately resulted in the conclusion
that she and Terran had lived there
for a period of two to four months.
Petitioner also testified during a
deposition that she and Terran
visited the subject premises
frequently during the times she was
not residing there. Construing the
evidence most favorably to the
opposing party, the judge hearing
the motion concluded that the extent
of Terran 's exposure to lead paint
was twice a week before residing
there and three to four times a week
for up to three hours at a time after
residing there.
Petitioner's lead paint expert

testified that due to the vague
responses Petitioner gave during
the
depositions and the
interrogatories, he could not say
with medical probability that
Terran 's interaction with the
subject premises was a major
contributor to the injuries. However,
the expert did say that two months
ofexposure was an insufficient period
to yield a substantial cause in Terran's
injuries.
Respondents moved for
summary judgment based on
Petitioner's expert's deposition
which indicated that it would be
difficult to render an opinion as to
substantial causation. Respondents
also cited the expert's opinion that
such causation was unlikely if the
basis was a two-month stay at the
subject premises. Petitioner
responded to the motion with three
affidavits. Petitioner's affidavit
contained statements indicating that
she resided on the subject premises
for five and a half months, a
significantly greater period of time
than that which was given during
depositions and interrogatories.
Based on this affidavit, Petitioner's
expert opined that the alleged five and
a half months of exposure could be a
substantial factor in bringing about the

harm.
The respondents moved to
strike the affidavits, claiming that they
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contradicted Hall's original
deposition testimony as to the length
of time she and Terran resided at
the subject premises in addition to
how frequently they visited. No
explanation was given as to why the
affidavits contained contradicting
statements.
The Circuit Court for Baltimore
City granted both the motion to strike
and summary judgment. The motions
were granted due to the significant
changes and contradictions in the
testimony. The court felt that the
discovery process would be
subverted if a witness can
dramatically alter testimony a year
later. The petitioners appealed and
the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland affirmed the circuit
court's ruling. The court said that
the inclusion of the new affidavits
would constitute an unfair surprise.
The court also adopted the "sham
affidavit" rule, derived from federal
caselaw. The petitioners appealed
to the Court of Appeals ofMaryland.
Petitioners argued that the
court of special appeals erred,
claiming issues of credibility under
Maryland law are to be determined
by the fact-finder, not the judge. !d.
at526, 754A.2dat 1037. Petitioners
also argued that they had a right to
file the affidavits or, in the
alternative, that the affidavits merely
supplement and clarify prior
discovery. !d. Respondents urged
that the court accept the federal "sham
affidavit" rule and conclude that the
deposition testimony is inherently more
reliable. !d.
The court of appeals first noted
that the caselaw interpreting the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
FRCP) 56 does not directly address
he issue of an affidavit submitted
in response to a motion for summary
judgment that contradicts earlier
deposition testimony. !d. at 527,
754 A.2d at 1037. In Perrna
Research & Development Co. v.
Singer Co., the Second Circuit
developed the "sham affidavit"
rule, stating:
[i]f an interested party has
personal knowledge of the
relevant facts, and if that
party cannot explain a
material contradiction
between
deposition
testimony and a subsequent
affidavit by the acquisition
of
newly
acquired
evidence, then the trial court
may disregard the affidavit
as a 'sham,' i.e. as one
failing to 'raise any issue
which [the trial court] can
call genuine.'
!d. at 529,754 A.2d at 1038 (citing
410 F.2d 572 (2nd. Cir. 1969)). The
Perma court stated that a trial court
may consider deposition testimony
as more reliable than an affidavit
because it is subject to crossexamination. !d. The court also
indicated that the contradictory
affidavit may be disregarded to
insure the utility of the summary
judgment procedure (i.e. to screen
out sham claims) and a party should
not be allowed to produce a genuine
issue of material fact based on
inconsistent statements. !d.
The Court of Appeals of
Maryland first addressed the
Respondents' contention that the

Petitioners violated the scheduling
order and the discovery cutoff dates
by filing supplemental affidavits
beyond the court ordered deadline.
!d. at 533-34, 754 A.2d at 1041.
The court rejected this contention
because the Maryland rules
expressly authorize the filing of an
affidavit in response to a motion for
summary judgment. Id. at 534,754
A.2d at 1041. This is separate from
the discovery dates and the
scheduling order. !d.
The court then said that the
federal "sham affidavit" rule was
contrary to Maryland's interpretation
of the summary judgment rule. !d.
The federal rule requires the trial judge
to make a credibility determination,
finding support in the FRCP 56's
phrase "genuine" issue ofmaterial fact.
!d. In contrast, Maryland law has not
viewed the function of a summary
judgment motion as a proper vehicle
for determining credibility. !d. at
536, 754A.2dat 1042. All that the
non-moving party needs to produce
to prevent a summary judgment
motion is evidence from which a
reasonable jury could find for the
non-moving party. !d. at 538, 754
A.2d at 1043. However, if claims
are so implausible or ridiculous, a
judge may conclude that a rational
juror could not reasonably find for
the plaintiff. !d.
In Pittman, the court found that
a reasonable juror could believe the
affidavits ofthe Petitioners. !d. at
539, 754 A.2d at 1044. The court
also said that there were other ways
in which a court can deal with what
they believe are "sham affidavits." !d.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
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considered perjury charges
and potential sanctions as an
effective
deterrent
to
individuals who may produce
an inaccurate affidavit for the
sole purpose of forestalling
summary judgment.
/d. at
542-43, 754 A.2d at 1046.
The court also advocated use
of the "catch-all" power
under Rule 2-504(b )(2)(G)
which allows the court to
order "any other matter
pertinent to the management
of the action." /d. at 543,
754 A.2d at 1046.
The court addressed the
dissent's assertion that an analysis
of internally contradictory trial
testimony based on the holding in
Kucharczyk v. State, 235 Md. 334,
201 A.2d 683 (1964) should apply.
/d. at 543-44, 754 A.2d at 10464 7. The court said that Kucharczyk,
which states that "testimony that is
so contradictory that it lacked
probative force ... [make it]
... insufficient to support a finding
beyond a reasonable doubt of the
facts required to be proven," does
not apply to every situation that
involves testimony. /d. at 544, 754
A.2d at 1046. The court stated that
the analysis only applies when the
contradiction goes to the core issues
of the case or the criminal agency
of the defendant. /d. at 545, 754
A.2d at 1047.
The effect of Pittman may be
detrimental to the court's policy
goals of judicial economy. It
appears now that summary judgment
motions may be easily defeated by
conjuring up an alternative story. The
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court indicates
that the
interests of justice will be
better served by allowing the
claim to go through, with the
hope that the declarant will
explain away the misunderstanding.
Innocent parties will have to go
through the expense, inconvenience
and embarrassment of a lawsuit,
when the factual basis does not
really support one. Additionally, the
role of discovery becomes less
important when the opponent to
summary judgment is permitted to
bring forth supposed "facts" that
completely surprise the moving
party and ultimately leads to an
unfair advantage. While the role of
the ultimate fact-finder needs to be
preserved, the court's interpretation
of the particular roles in the judicial
process is far too rigid. By rejecting
the "sham affidavit" rule, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland has opened
the door for false testimony to be
paraded in front of the jury,
ultimately defeating any hope of
judicial economy.

